Everything about Deterrence Theory totally explained
» This article refers to deterrent theories of punishment. For the legal theory of justice, see Deterrence (legal).
Deterrence theory is a military strategy developed during
Cold War. It is especially relevant with regard to the use of
nuclear weapons, and figures prominently on current United States foreign policy regarding the development of nuclear technology in
North Korea and
Iran.
The term is also used more generally to refer to a strategy in any field of potential conflict of being prepared to inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor, and making sure the potential aggressor is aware of the risk so that he refrains from aggression.
Strategy
Deterrence is a strategy by which governments threaten an immense retaliation if attacked, such that aggressors are deterred if they don't wish to suffer great damage as a result of an aggressive action.
Weapons of mass destruction (WMDs),
conventional weapons strength, economic sanctions, or any combination of these can be used as deterrents.
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) is a form of this strategy, which came to prominence during the Cold War when it was used by the US to characterize relations between the United States and Soviet Union, although the Soviet Union didn't in fact adhere to MAD and was prepared to fight a full scale nuclear and conventional war.
Deterrence by denial is a strategy whereby a government builds up or maintains defense and intelligence systems with the purported aim of neutralizing or mitigating attacks. Aggressors are deterred if they choose not to act, perceiving the cost of their action to be too high in relation to its likely success.
Deterrence is viewed by some as the opposite of
appeasement, where an expansionist government is allowed to absorb some territory to reach a negotiated settlement, (for example, the
Munich Agreement prior to World War II).
History
United States policy of deterrence during the
Cold War underwent significant variations. The early stages of the Cold War were generally characterized by ideology of
Containment, an aggressive stance on behalf of the United States especially regarding
developing nations under their
sphere of influence. This period was characterized by numerous
proxy wars throughout most of the globe, particularly Africa, Asia, Central America, and South America. A notable such conflict was the
Korean War. In contrast to general opinion,
George F. Kennan, who is taken to be the founder of this ideology in the famous
Long Telegram, asserted that his ideas had been misinterpreted and that he never advocated military intervention, merely economic support.
With the US pullout in Vietnam, the normalization of US relations with China, and the
Sino-Soviet Split, the policy of Containment was abandoned and a new policy of
détente was established, whereby peaceful coexistence was sought between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although all factors listed above contributed to this shift, the most important factor was probably the rough parity achieved in stockpiling nuclear weapons with the clear capability of
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Therefore, the period of détente was characterized by a general reduction in the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States and a thawing of the Cold War, lasting from the late 1960s until the start of the 1980s. The doctrine of
Mutual Nuclear Deterrence characterized relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during this period, and present relations with Russia.
A third shift occurred with President
Ronald Reagan's arms build-up during the 1980s. Reagan attempted to justify this policy in part due to concerns of growing Soviet influence in Latin America and the new republic of
Iran, established after the
Iranian Revolution of 1979. Similar to the old policy of Containment, the United States funded several
proxy wars, including support for
Saddam Hussein of
Iraq during the
Iran-Iraq War, support for the
mujahideen in
Afghanistan, who were fighting for independence from the Soviet Union, and several anti-communist movements in Latin America such as the overthrow
Sandinista government in
Nicaragua. The funding of the
Contras in Nicaragua led to the
Iran-Contra Affair, while overt support led to a ruling from the
International Court of Justice against the United States in
Nicaragua v. United States. The United States refused to obey this warning and pay the fine.
While the army was dealing with the break up of the Soviet Union and the spread of nuclear technology to other nations beyond the United States and Russia, the concept of deterrence took on a broader multinational dimension. The US policy on post-Cold War deterrence was outlined in 1995 in a document called "
Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence". This document explains that while relations with Russia continue to follow the traditional characteristics of
Mutual Nuclear Deterrence, due to both nations continuing
Mutually Assured Destruction, US policy of deterrence towards nations with minor nuclear capabilities should ensure through threats of immense retaliation (or even
preemptive action) that they don't threaten the United States, its interests, or allies. The document explains that such threats must also be used to ensure that nations without nuclear technology refrain from developing nuclear weapons and that a universal ban precludes any nation from maintaining chemical or biological weapons. The current tensions with Iran and North Korea over their nuclear programs are due in part to the continuation of this policy of deterrence.
Criticism
Deterrence theory is criticized for its assumptions about opponent rationales: first, it's argued that suicidal or psychopathic opponents may not be deterred by either forms of deterrence. Second, diplomatic misunderstandings and/or opposing political ideologies may lead to escalating mutual perceptions of threat, and a subsequent
arms race which elevates the risk of actual war (this scenario is illustrated in the movies
WarGames and
Dr. Strangelove). An
arms race is inefficient in its
optimal output; all countries involved expend resources on armaments which wouldn't have been expended if the others hadn't expended resources. This is a form of
positive feedback.
Finally, a military build-up increases a country's risks of
budget deficits, restrictions on
civil liberties, the creation of a
military-industrial complex, and other such potentially-undesirable measures. See
Garrison State.
Psychology and deterrence
A new form of criticism emerged in the late 1980s with detailed analyses of the actions of individual leaders and groups of leaders in crisis situations (historical and theoretical).
A number of new or nuanced criticisms of "traditional" deterrence theory emerged. One was that deterrence theory assumed that both sides had common rational peaceful goals. In some real-life situations, such as the
Yom Kippur War, leaders felt that internal or external political considerations forced a conflict. One of the essays in, regarding the internal military and political discussions within the Egyptian high command in 1973, indicates that senior civilian leaders (including
Anwar Sadat) believed that they'd to fight a war in order to have enough internal political support to negotiate for peace.
In another miscalculation, Israel rationalized that the Israeli military dominance would deter any attack, and believed that no rational Syrian or Egyptian leader would attempt such an attack. Sadat felt unable to avoid a war, and Syria's leadership misjudged the military situation and believed they could be victorious. Israel assumed rational and well-informed opponents with clear objectives, and its deterrence failed.
Another observation is that crisis situations can reach a point that formerly stabilizing actions (such as keeping military units at bases, and low alert levels) can be seen as a sign of weakness, and that perceived weakness can then induce an opponent to attack during the perceived time of advantage. Thus, an inversion point exists, after which some formerly stabilizing actions become destabilizing, and some formerly destabilizing actions become stabilizing.
Finally, studies of the specific group psychology of several leaders and leader groups, including the Israeli and Arab leaders in 1973 and the Kennedy Administration during the
Bay of Pigs and
Cuban Missile Crisis, indicated that in many cases executive groups use
poor decision-making techniques and improperly assess available information. These errors can and often do preclude truly rational end-behavior in deterrence situations.
Further Information
Get more info on 'Deterrence Theory'.
|
External Link Exchanges
Do you know how hard it is to get a link from a large encyclopaedia? Well we're different and will prove it. To get a link from us just add the following HTML to your site on a relevant page:
<a href="http://deterrence_theory.totallyexplained.com">Deterrence theory Totally Explained</a>
Then simply click through this link from your web page. Our crawlers will verify your link, extract the title of your web page and instantly add a link back to it. If you like you can remove the words Totally Explained and embed the link in article text.
As long as your link remains in place, we'll keep our link to you right here. Please play fair - our crawlers are watching. Your site must be closely related to this one's topic. Any kind of spamming, dubious practises or removing the link will result in your link from us being dropped and, potentially, your whole site being banned. |
